The awkward role of the OSCE in Ukraine

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2014/12/10 • Archive

Article by: Nicole Gallina

There was a lot of clapping last week as Switzerland ended its OSCE-chairmanship and praised its role in Ukraine.

Sadly, there is practically zero objection in the public (and most notably German-speaking media) to those disputable claims.

Some facts on the “security” mission:

  1. The OSCE has been able to control two border crossings on the uncontrolled 400kmlong Ukrainian-Russian border strip, some 40 Meters.
  2. Russia has prevented more observers on the border and also prevented observers to travel there. The OSCE-coordinator for border questions is Alexej Lyzhenkov, a former official in the Russian foreign ministry
  3. Russia thus has been able to get all its heavy artillery, tanks, special forces, regular troops and volunteers etc. to the current cease-fire line (see sprotyv.info, the Interpreter and Conflict Reporter)
  4. Russia has been able to storm selected targets on almost a daily basis, most notably theDonetsk airport
  5. In some areas, the front has been shifted a few dozen kilometers to the west after 5 September 2014 (compare the maps of Ukrainian gains and losses from the NSDC or the Interpreter)
  6. The OSCE has not been able to enforce the cease-fire provision to control the border and the cease-fire with its drones. They finally were delivered in mid-October (six weeks after the “cease-fire”), but have practically not been used as the occupying forceshave shot at them
  7. OSCE-symbols have been misused by the occupying forces
  8. President Poroshenko claimed that out of 270 observers, only 90 are in eastern Ukraine – we do not know where the rest is (in Kyiv?)
  9. The OSCE has reportedly passed on military information to the Russian side
  10. The OSCE-mission near Mariupol has reportedly passed on military information to the Russian side (one Ukrainian adviser claimed 80% of those in the mission had a Russian  background)
  11. The OSCE has published reports discrediting Ukraine (i.e. shelling a Donetsk school – the shells most probably came from the occupying forces)
  12. Ukrainian soldiers have claimed they were shelled after visits of the OSCE.
  13. The mission largely exludes Ukraine. Ukraine is not allowed to have representatives in the mission – instead it favors the aggressor: Russia. The country has representatives in its own country contingent (10%) and potentially in the contingents of other post-Soviet, eastern European, and German-speaking countries. The OSCE has not published a list on how the mission is combined (they only stated that they prefer “Russian-speaking“)
  14. Propaganda is essential to the Russian side. OSCE’s ‚senior press assistant‘ Irina Gudyma is a Russian national
  15. The OSCE-representative for the issue of human trafficking Kazakhstan’s Madina Jarbusynova, used an appearance on Ukrainian TV to spread a false claim by the Russian state media of Ukrainian atrocities including “organ-trafficking”

What have been the advantages for Ukraine of the OSCE being there?

Next, the OSCE-chairmanship is going to Serbia that has not supported the western sanctions and has a clear pro-Russian line – hightime to kindly ask the OSCE to leave Ukraine!

Source: Osteuropastudien

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  • W8post

    8) in Lviv!

  • W8post

    OSCE shouldn’t have been let into Ukraine in the first place; invite any Serbian and/or Russian delegation to have a peep behind enemy lines (read Ukraine lines) and report back home! So much easier for all parties and OSCE doesn’t have to pretend ‘observing’ whatever they think they are ‘observing’.