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Anti-Terrorist operation: Summary for August 1, 2014, as of 12:00

Anti-Terrorist operation: Summary for August 1, 2014, as of 12:00

Donetsk Oblast: North & Western Donetsk and Horlivka

Yesterday we reported that the ATO forces liberated Avdiivka and proceeded to Yasynuvata. Thus the complete encirclement of Horlyvka is almost done. This means that terrorists will probably counterattack from Donetsk in this direction, or may try to breach the ATO encirclement from Horlivka via Panteleimonivka.in order to reach Donesk. The consolidation of ATO positions around Horlivka continues and further information will be reported when it becomes available.

Donetsk Oblast: South and Central Areas

Over the previous 24 hour period the militants continued their attacks on positions of the Ukrainian forcers in the Savur-Mohyla and Uspenka. As we warned, in Amvrosiivka the DNR terrorists behaved so freely that inflicted losses to the ATO forces and the State border forces.

We will try to explain what was happened.  The vigilance of the ATO forces was relaxed after the reports about a “brilliant victories” in the South-East of Donetsk. At the same time, the terrorists used the tactics of guerrilla warfare flowing through the ATO forces and starting to act in their rear. This is what happened during the night in Amvrosiivka. Because there was no one to back our forces, the Ukrainian forces immediately received a thrust in the Vasylivka area from Mokrojelanchyk village, which was considered free. Therefore we didn’t mark Amvrosiivka on our maps in the ATO zone of control.

In the area south of the city of Donetsk our forces have released Novyi Svit and carried out an assault on Donetsk from the South. They also quickly took Ilovaisk. But again, unfortunately without the consolidation of their position they moved on further.

A similar situation happened on Savur-Mohyla. The height was taken by the ATO forces, but they then pushed on to Rovenky and Sverdlovsk in the Luhansk Region without the liberation of Snizhne. Unfortunately this  allowed the terrorists to strike Savur-Mogila from Snizhne, almost resulting in a gloomy conclusion for the troops on Savur-Mogila. There is a question as to why there was no backup for our military units on the Savur-Mogila?

Now let us talk about Shakhtarsk and N21 highway. By morning of August, 1 the highway had not been blocked. Terrorists accumulated in Zuhres in order to ensure control over the highway. A lot of military equipment (especially multiple rocket launchers) arrived in Zuhres. Realizing that it is impossible to attack from the direction of the highway, Ukrainian troops advanced upon Shakhtarsk from a northerly direction (from Rozsypne). Then the question arises: why do Ukrainian forces advance only towards Shakhtarsk and ignore Zuhres? Do they want another stab in the back?

Luhansk Oblast: South of Luhansk and the Border

Yesterday the OSCE mission arrived to the Izvaryne border post. Unfortunately they only observed the section of the border around the borderpost, while the routes the Russians use for their reinforcements is at well over 10kms to the north through villages of Sjevernyi, Popivka, and Velykyi Sukhodil. All three used routes converge into one road and go through the area of the mine Sukhodilska-East, going directly to the city of Sukhodilsk (Krasnodon district), and onto the highway M04.

Terrorists continue to build up their forces along the M04 highway (Krasnodon, Molodohvardiisk, Novohannivka, Novosvetlivka). They expect that the ATO forces will attack from the direction of Vilkhova (East of Luhansk) and advance upon Izvaryne.  The Ukrainian grouping in the area of Lutuhyne are currently cut off from the main forces. Let us hope that Ukrainian troops are able to complete the encirclement of Luhansk from the eastern side and provide a corridor for that grouping. Otherwise the story of Chervonopartyzansk is going to reoccur here.

At the same time the terrorists continue to move their troops into the Dyakove area from Rovenky, in order to block ATO reinforcements to the troops on the border. It is clear that we need to create a supply route to the guys in Chervonopartyzansk, where they sit in trenches bitterly exposed to shelling by GRAD missile systems.

Forecast of Provocations

For the last 24 hours the conflict in Ukraine has continued with the active intervention of the Russian Federation. The deployment of equipment and personnel of the enemy to terrorist units in the Donbas continues without pause.

Another column of the Russian armoured vehicles came to Ukraine on the night of July 31st. With these re-enforcements there are three likely alternative directions of terrorist attacks:

  1. Along the M03 to Fashchivka where the enemy might make an attempt to attack the АTO forces which are pushing from Debaltseve to Krasnyi Luch.
  2. Through Alchevsk to Bryanka, where there is the concentration of the terrorist forces which could pose a threat to the Ukrainian troops which are trying to liberate Pervomaisk.
  3. Through Achevsk to Bryanka, but instead of attacking towards Pervomaisk this force could attack south towards Debalseve in order to split and cut off the ATO forces in the North Luhansk area from the forces South of Donesk.

 We already got the negative experiences of carelessness in protecting our rear in Amvrosiivka and Savur-Mogila, and this has to be taken into account to prevent new errors.

The External Threat

The number of Russian troops along the border with Ukraine continues to increase. If the Russian Federation decides to attack, this will likely happen in the area of Kharkiv and Sumy regions. It is interesting that Ukrainian law enforcers found a car packed with weapons and ammunition in the forest near Korolevets (Sumy region). This could indicate future subversive activity in this direction.

We should not forget about large grouping of the Russian forces in the Rostov region and the bridgehead of approaches to the mainland from occupied Crimea. The only good news is that the Russian Federation has to transfer its forces from other border regions in order to build up forces there; this means that Russia has problems with battle-worthy units. Thus, if the Russian Federation sends troops, they may well experience problems with resources limitations. Besides, it is noteworthy that the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the 4 months of the war in Donbas have gotten much more relevant battle experience than the Russian Federation got from the 10 years of the war in Chechnya. Why? Because Chechen forces had no tanks, no air defense etc. And if the Ukrainian forces already begin to gain control over the situation in such conditions, then open confrontation in the war will not be a `cakewalk’ for the Russian army.

[hr]By Roman Burko, burkonews.info
Translated by Victoria Field and Oxana Tinko; edited by Larry Field

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